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Abstract 
The executive functions are crucial for leading a deliberate life which delicately balances the 
considerations posed by ourselves and our surroundings. Several of the most common mental 
illnesses impact executive functions. In order to develop effective treatments, efficient and 
reliable ways of measuring executive functioning are required. One of the most popular tests 
of executive function is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), which has been proposed 
to challenge a range of functions, including working memory, cognitive flexibility, and 
making logical inferences. An fMRI-study was done to investigate the neural substrate for 
performing the WCST, alongside a newly developed auditory adaptation of the test for use 
with the visually impaired. A high-level control condition where the sorting rule was 
disclosed was used, in an attempt to sift out working memory storage functions from 
manipulation and hypothesis generating functions. Contrasting the visual test with the 
auditory one revealed activation limited to the sensory cortices. Contrasting the tests with the 
high level control condition revealed a frontoparietal network including the frontal eye fields 
and the intraparietal sulci. These results highlight the importance of a distributed network of 
brain areas for solving the WCST, which is not limited to the frontal cortex. In addition, the 
lack of a difference between the WCST and the Auditory Sorting Task outside of the sensory 
cortices supports the application of the AST as a substitute for the WCST in the visually 
impaired population. 
 
Keywords: fMRI, wisconsin card sorting test, executive functions, dorsal attention network 
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Sammendrag  
De eksekutive funksjoner er avgjørende for en gjennomtenkt livsførsel som nennsomt ivaretar 
både ens egne og ens omgivelsers hensyn. Flere av de vanligste mentale lidelser forstyrrer 
eksekutive funksjoner. For å utvikle effektive behandlingsformer, er det nødvendig med 
pålitelige og kostnadseffektive måter å måle eksekutiv fungering på. En av de mest populære 
tester av eksekutiv fungering er Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), som er blitt sagt å 
utfordre en rekke funksjoner, inkludert arbeidsminne, kognitiv fleksibilitet og det å trekke 
logiske slutninger. En fMRI-studie ble gjort for å undersøke det nevrale grunnlaget for 
utførelsen av WCST, i tillegg til en nylig utviklet auditiv tilpasning av testen til bruk med 
synshemmede. En kontrollbetingelse der sorteringsregelen ble oppgitt ble brukt, i et forsøk på 
å sile ut lagringsfunksjoner i arbeidsminne fra bearbeidende og hypoteseproduserende 
funksjoner. Ved sammenlikning av den visuelle testen med den auditive, ble det avslørt 
aktivering begrenset til de sensoriske barker. Ved sammenlikning av testene med 
kontrollbetingelsen, ble det avslørt aktivering i et frontoparietalt nettverk som innbefattet de 
frontale øyefelt og de intraparietale furer. Disse resultatene understreker viktigheten av et 
utstrakt nettverk av hjerneområder for utførelsen av WCST, som ikke er begrenset til 
frontallappen. I tillegg støtter fraværet av ulikhet mellom WCST og Auditory Sorting Task ut 
over de sensoriske barker bruken av AST som erstatning for WCST i den synshemmede 
befolkning. 
 
Nøkkelord: fMRI, wisconsin card sorting test, eksekutive funksjoner, dorsale 
oppmerksomhetsnettverk 
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Preface  
When Professor Karsten Specht asked me if I would like to analyse some fMRI-data 
of an experiment using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, I was excited about getting some 
hands-on experience with neuroimaging data. However, the theory surrounding the construct 
“executive functions”, and the epistemological issues about drawing inferences about mental 
functions from performance on a test, were quite overwhelming. Although I’ve learned about 
many interesting lines of research – and many of these revealed a convergence, which always 
fascinates me – the field still seems enormous to me. Luckily, I had the practical processing 
and analysis of the data to relax with when the literature got too hairy.  
The experiment that this thesis is based on was designed and performed by Professor 
Specht and colleagues, but the data were left untreated for reasons not disclosed to me. As I 
knew next to nothing about the handling of this type of data, I was surprised to find that the 
procedure was really quite straightforward. The software tool, SPM, allows for much more 
customisability than is usually presented in the guides, though, and so some experimentation 
was required for me to fully grasp when to do what. When I had tried my hand on some 
example data, I went to PhD Candidate Justyna Beresniewicz to have my skills assessed. 
Although she said I had become proficient, she still graciously spent several hours tweaking 
the MATLAB code, in order to find a more efficient way for me to run the procedures.  
When the final analyses were over, I was met with a new challenge: What do these 
images mean? This set off a long and arduous trek through the literature which I still feel I’ve 
only just started on. What especially caught my attention was how central motivation is to not 
only the executive functions, but also how the processes underlying motivation actually shape 
the perception of reality, such as in schizophrenia. This, however, was something of a trap, as 
the literature on schizophrenia turned out to be bottomless, and this experiment was not 
directly related to that particular subject.  
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In the end, I think I managed to pick out literature that sheds some light on what the 
executive functions are, why they matter, and some ways they can be studied. I know that 
there are several of the theoretical questions discussed in this paper that I will follow with 
great interest also after submission. The analyses, interpretation, and literature search that 
went towards this thesis were very much independently done by myself, with sparse but 
influential guidance provided by my supervisors.  
I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Karsten Specht for his help throughout 
this process, and for his contagious intellectual enthusiasm. I would also like to thank PhD 
Candidate Justyna Beresniewicz for introducing me to SPM and for taking the time to work 
out original MATLAB-scripts for my benefit. I am also grateful to Kristiina Kompus for 
fluidly making the arrangements for me to get involved with this project. Finally, I wish to 
thank my loving and stalwart girlfriend, Maria Befring Hage, for emotional, critical, and 
alimentary support throughout this challenge.  
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 A Frontoparietal Network Underlies both the Standard and an Auditory Adaptation of 
the WCST 
The executive functions are a set of psychological constructs that are thought to 
underlie the concerted use of cognition in the service of achieving goals. The ones that are 
generally included are self-control, interference control, working memory, and cognitive 
flexibility (Diamond, 2013). Many of them are characterised by how they primarily modulate 
other processes, rather than acting alone (Miller & Cohen, 2001). This can make testing them 
difficult, as they have to be inferred from how other functions are used (Miyake & Friedman, 
2012).  
Creating a plan might be an example of an activity where most, if not all, executive 
functions are needed (Owen, 1997; Tanji & Hoshi, 2001). Working memory and imagination 
are needed to envision the faraway goal which motivates the plan. They’re also needed to 
think of all the necessary steps and contingencies towards that goal. Attention has to be 
controlled away from distractions and towards this activity and, by extension, the future. Self-
control must be exerted to finish the plan and not give in to the temptations of doing more 
pleasant things instead. Planning – instead of acting on impulse – is probably what most 
defines these executive functions. They are there to guide behaviour towards goals not 
currently perceived, and to protect against dangers not yet encountered. (Casey et al., 2011; 
Rogers et al., 1999).  
Though the term executive functions didn’t become widely used until the seventies, 
the functions that this term refers to were studied previously. Short-term memory – distinct 
from the working variant according to some, but still a necessary component of it – was 
studied already in the 1950s by Miller (1956). The control of attention was proposed as a 
necessary faculty by Donald Broadbent in 1958. Posner and Petersen (1990) suggested later 
that there must be an “executive” attention system, and Baddeley and Hitch (1974) also 
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included a “Central Executive” in their model of working memory. Although there now is 
general agreement about what to call them as a group, the particular functions can sometimes 
be trickier to define (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Miller, 2013). 
In the following sections, the executive functions will be described, together with the 
neural structures and/or processes thought to underlie them. Sometimes the same functions 
will go under different names, and sometimes different functions will go under the same 
name. Efforts have been made to disentangle some of these knots, but some confusion will 
probably remain. Afterwards, there will be a short review of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST) and its applications. The last part of the introduction will describe the importance of 
dopamine to the executive functions, and how dopamine dysregulation is implicated in 
several conditions displaying as key symptoms problems with executive function. Then the 
present work will describe an experiment investigating on the one hand, a newly developed 
auditory adaptation of the WCST called the Auditory Sorting Task (AST), and on the other 
hand, the neural substrates underlying performance on the WCST. The results of this 
experiment will then finally be discussed in light of the disambiguations of the executive 
functions attempted in the introduction. 
Working Memory 
Memory could be defined as the ability to retain information in the absence of any 
external stimulus. The distinction between short-term and long term memory was shown in 
the case of Henry Molaison, formerly known by his initials H.M., who had crippling 
anterograde amnesia of long term declarative memory, but an intact short term memory after a 
bilateral lesion of the medial temporal lobes (Scoville & Milner, 1957).  
According to Baddeley and Hitch (1974), working memory can be modelled as several 
sensory modality bound buffer components which “rehearse” whatever memories you’re 
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working with. There were originally two of these, the phonological loop which is made up of 
an ability to store memory traces of sound for a very short time and a rehearsal process 
similar to internal speech, and the visuospatial sketchpad which can hold a limited amount of 
objects and their visual and spatial features (Baddeley, 2003). A control system was 
hypothesized to allocate attention between these according to circumstance, termed the 
central executive. The division of working memory into different modalities was motivated 
by findings from dual task paradigms, where performing two tasks simultaneously would be 
more impaired if the tasks were in the same modality than if they were not (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974). The idea that memory could be divided in this way is supported by research on 
long-term memory, where recall of a memory in a certain modality is reflected in activity in 
the corresponding sensory cortex (Binder & Desai, 2011). However, working memory was in 
the earliest neuroscientific papers often localised to the frontal cortex (Fuster & Alexander, 
1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Cohen et al., 1997). Does this mean that the frontal cortex can 
represent information from any modality, or does it mean that working memory 
representations are more abstract? What those early studies typically reported was that there is 
sustained neural activity in the frontal cortex that corresponds to the delay in which the 
subject is holding something in memory before giving a response proving that the memory 
was retained (Fuster & Alexander, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Cohen et al., 1997). The 
types of memories subjects typically are asked to hold could well be described as sparse. That 
is, they are positions (Goldman-Rakic, 1987), relations (Cohen et al., 1997), contingencies 
(White & Wise, 1999), rules (Wallis, Anderson, & Miller, 2001) and numbers (Paulesu, Frith, 
& Frackowiak, 1993). It may be that the frontal cortex only deals with sparse representations, 
or it could be that the sustained activity is somehow signalling to more posterior areas for 
them to in turn hold the complete representations (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Postle, 2006). 
Zeman et al. (2010) reported a case of such a dissociation between florid mental imagery and 
NEURAL SUBSTRATE OF WCST AND AST       12  
abstract visuospatial representations, wherein the subject, MX, showed normal frontal 
activation, but abnormal activation in posterior cortex. Others have shown that working 
memory is not uniquely present in the frontal cortex. Warrington and Shallice (1969) reported 
that a young man who had suffered a strike to his left parietal cortex, displayed a selective 
impairment of verbal working memory. Postle (2006) suggests that the short-term storage of 
information is actually subserved by more posterior areas of the brain, more specifically, the 
areas that are involved in the perception of the same kinds of information. In this regard, 
delay-period activity in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) might reflect a more managerial function, 
where it is biasing posterior cortex to prioritise the to-be-remembered information in some 
way (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Said another way, the PFC could 
play the role of remembering what to remember. One could say that short-term memory 
interference effects of PFC disruption is support for this view (Chao & Knight, 1995; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 2002), but if the PFC is telling posterior cortex to remember 
something, and the PFC doesn’t store information on its own, who is telling the PFC to tell 
posterior cortex to remember? In a lesion study by Petrides (2000), a double dissociation was 
observed where inferotemporal lesions disrupted retention, while dorsolateral PFC lesions 
disrupted the ability to monitor many items at once. This shows that posterior cortex is needed 
to retain information across a delay, while the dorsolateral PFC is not.  
 To summarize, short term memory was early shown to be something different than 
long term memory. It was hypothesized that short term memory was enacted by specific 
modules in the brain, like Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) components, or the frontal cortex. 
However, consecutive research has led to the assumption that short term memory can be 
performed by most parts of the cortex, and often by the same parts that are involved in 
perception in that modality. Nevertheless it is likely that some sort of control mechanism is 
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affecting what to be remembered, including areas in the frontal cortex (D’Esposito & Postle, 
2015; Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
Inhibition 
The mind is able to imagine many courses of action at any single moment, yet the 
body is only able to do more or less one thing at a time. In order to choose the one thing to do, 
one has to be able to suppress all the other impulses one might have. This ability to suppress 
impulses underlies the very notion of making choices, as were we not able to put an action on 
hold, the choice would already have been made before we were done deciding. This could be 
why Miyake & Friedman (2012), in their factor analysis of executive functions, couldn’t 
separate inhibition-specific variance from variance common to all the executive functions. 
That is, inhibition was found to be central to performance on all measures of executive 
functions.  
The experience of being faced with a choice is captured in the term ‘cognitive 
conflict’. The posterior medial PFC and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have been linked 
to cognitive conflict and performance evaluation (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; 
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Activity in these areas increases 
prior to making a decision between two competing responses (overriding prepotent responses 
or underdetermined responses), and also after making a response that turns out to be wrong. It 
is hypothesized that these areas, either directly or through signals to neighbouring areas, 
adjust the amount of cognitive control that is expended on a task, depending on how well 
things are going (Botvinick et al., 2004).  
Many different tasks where the inhibition of a response is needed regularly engage the 
ACC, like the flanker task (Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & Raichle, 1990), the go/no-go task (Braver, 
Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001), and the Stroop Test (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, 
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Carter, & Cohen, 1999). The Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935) has shown this frequently (MacLeod 
& MacDonald, 2000). In the Stroop Test, the subject is presented colour names one by one, in 
differently coloured ink. The objective is to pronounce the name of colour of the ink. It is 
regularly shown that people have more difficulty with this task when the presented colour 
name is written in an ink of a different colour.  
Holroyd and Yeung (2012) propose that the ACC is involved in the hierarchical 
maintenance of goals and sub-goals, using these representations to evaluate different action-
options within a broader context. Self-control involves comparing two or more options 
suspected of yielding reward, and choosing the option which yields the larger reward even 
though the other option seems more enticing (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). How it’s even 
possible for the brain to know that one option is more rewarding while at the same time 
representing a different option as seemingly more rewarding, is quite strange. Partly 
motivated by how lesions of the ACC can result in akinetic mutism (Németh, Hegedüs, 
Molnâr, 1988), Holroyd and Yeung (2012) propose that the ACC is necessary to construe any 
extended behaviour as worthwhile. They argue that any action always takes some immediate 
effort, but that normally, this effort is justified by whatever longer term goals the action leads 
to. What the ACC does, according to Holroyd and Yeung (2012), is link the different action-
options to the expected results, and compare the expected pay-off of each option.  
Persons suffering from addiction seem to have problems with inhibiting whichever 
behaviour they’re addicted to. The reason for this might be that their urges are stronger than 
other people’s urges (Robinson & Berridge, 1993), or it might be that their ability to act 
contrary to their urges is weaker than in other people (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). The 
latter option could for example be a difference in a frontostriatal control network investigated 
by Liston et al. (2006). Both of those might be the case, and there is even a third possible 
factor. Persons with damage to the ventromedial PFC are afflicted by a severe bias towards 
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short-term gratification (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), and many addicted 
individuals present with the same bias (Noël, Van der Linden, & Bechara, 2006). It is not that 
they can’t imagine the future consequences of their actions, but it seems those imagined 
consequences don’t influence their affect as they do for other people. If this is the case, then it 
is not really a problem of executive function, but a problem of motivation. They’re acting 
rationally within the premises of their limited ambitions.  
Also information can be inhibited. Patients with damage in PFC are impaired in a 
nonmatch-to-sample task where there are distracting stimuli in the delay (Chao & Knight, 
1995). Attention is also a type of inhibition of information, as everything that is not attended 
to is ignored. Again, patients with damage in the lateral PFC show larger amplitudes in early 
event-related potentials (ERP) taken from sensory cortices, suggesting that they are left more 
open to outside interference (Knight, Hillyard, Woods, & Neville, 1981). 
Rules and Cognitive Flexibility 
Keeping track of and following the rules for behaviour is central to the functions of the 
executive system. Anyone can act goal-directed if there is ever only one goal, and no 
intermediate considerations to take into account. Let’s say you are a five year old and want to 
buy ice cream. You could simply break the piggy bank and buy ice cream for the money 
inside, but then you’d get in trouble with your mother, and so you need to balance the two 
goals of buying ice cream and not getting in trouble with your mother. This is an example of 
how one’s own goals place limitations on each other. Even if one only has one goal, 
limitations can be placed on it from the outside world. There might be a line to get ice cream. 
Now, you could fight the other kids to get ice cream right now, but then you might get 
grounded, and you wouldn’t be able to buy ice cream the next day, so you wait for your turn. 
Navigating considerations like these is what the executive system is for. Behaving “correctly” 
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necessitates being aware of the different goals you have, while also being aware of the 
contexts that determine when pursuing them will be successful or not.  
Following rules is something that engages every part of the executive system. To 
follow a rule, the minimum requirements are that you have one thing you want to do, while 
simultaneously being aware that it is not the right thing to do, i.e. you need to represent in 
your mind two thoughts at once. You also need to be able to inhibit your impulses until you 
have decided. Additionally, a rule is only in special cases always meant to be followed, which 
means a person needs to be able to adapt flexibly to changing circumstances. Finally, a rule is 
by definition a generalisation, dictating how to behave across many specific situations. 
Therefore, to follow a rule, one needs to be able to generalise from specific exemplars. Some 
studies providing insight into how these abilities are manifested in the brain follow below. 
A combined match to sample and non-match to sample task that Wallis et al. (2001) 
used shows the learning of rules by single neurons in the PFC. Monkeys were trained to do 
two types of task, and had to perform either the one or the other, depending on which signal 
they were given. Wallis et al. (2001) showed that there were single neurons in the PFC which 
were selectively responsive to the rules determining which task to perform, independently of 
the stimulus features of the tasks and the rule-signalling cues.  
One experiment done by Buschman, Denovellis, Diogo, Bullock, and Miller (2012) 
explored the mechanisms underlying several of the executive functions discussed above. 
Arrays of electrodes were placed in the dorsolateral PFC of macaque monkeys, while the 
monkeys were making rule based judgements. A cue would tell the monkeys to either attend 
to the colour of a stimulus or to the orientation of the stimulus. The stimulus could be one of 
two colours, and in one of two orientations. Depending on which colour or orientation he 
stimulus was in, the monkey was supposed to look to the left or to the right. One half of the 
electrode pairs registered, in the beta band, synchronous oscillations connected to the colour 
NEURAL SUBSTRATE OF WCST AND AST       17  
rule, and the other half registered synchrony connected to the orientation rule. This suggests 
that the rhythm of neural activity plays a role in forming context-dependent ensembles out of 
a jumbled mass of neurons (Buschman et al., 2012). It was also found that after being cued to 
attend to colour, but before the stimulus had appeared, the ensemble that had showed 
synchrony connected to orientation was showing synchrony in the low-frequent alpha band. 
This effect, together with behavioural data showing an increased reaction time for the colour 
task compared to the orientation task, was interpreted as reflecting a need to suppress the 
orientation ensemble (Buschman et al., 2012).  
Another experiment was done on category learning (Antzoulatos & Miller, 2011). 
Two images were made of a distribution of spots, and then several hundred versions of these 
were made by distorting the originals. These several hundred exemplars could thus be 
classified into one of two categories based on which prototype they originated from. Macaque 
monkeys were trained to look to either direction depending on which category it was 
presented. The monkeys would start learning only a few exemplars, so that the task could be 
solved by simple stimulus-response-learning. The number of exemplars would increase, 
however, so that by the end, the monkeys would have to have extrapolated the categories or 
they would fail. Electrodes were recording from the striatum and the PFC. What Antzoulatos 
and Miller (2011) found was that during the early trials, neural activity in the striatum was a 
better predictor of performance than activity in the PFC, but in the later trials, this relationship 
was reversed. In another study (Antzoulatos & Miller, 2014), where these data were 
reanalysed, it was found that, during the middle trials when the monkeys were starting to 
learn the categories, there was an increase in synchronous oscillations between the striatum 
and the PFC. Then, in the final trials, when the monkeys had mastered the categories, there 
was an increase in category-specific synchronous oscillations between the striatum and the 
PFC (Antzoulatos & Miller, 2014). Buschman and Miller (2014) take these results, together 
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with the results from Buschman et al. (2012), as an indication of synchronous oscillations 
being the substrate for cognitive flexibility and set shifting. 
Maintaining task set and shifting task set sound like opposites. But the way these are 
tested suggests that they are more similar than they seem. The ability to maintain task set – or 
concentrate – is often tested by measuring performance in the face of distraction (Fenske & 
Eastwood, 2003) . The mechanisms behind this are generally described as inhibition of 
irrelevant stimuli or information. The ability to shift sets – or cognitive flexibility – is usually 
tested by giving alternating tasks, and measuring the switch cost – reductions in accuracy and 
increases in reaction time (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) – or the number of perseverative 
responses (Lacreuse, Parr, Chennareddi, & Herndon, 2018). Also in the case of flexibility are 
the mechanisms described as inhibition – inhibition of the previous task set. However, 
performance in concentration and flexibility often dissociate, with people performing well in 
one but not the other (Friedman, Miyake, Robinson, & Hewitt, 2011).  
Buschman and Miller (2014) suggest that cognitive flexibility is supported by the 
mixed selectivity of neurons and their ability to dynamically form different ensembles among 
neurons that are all structurally connected. Siegel, Warden, & Miller (2009) propose that one 
way in which two or more ensembles can exist simultaneously without them collapsing into 
one, is by oscillating out of phase with each other.  
 Cognitive flexibility can be defined simply as the ability to shift sets, or it could mean 
something more comprehensive, involving the ability to reconfigure the relations among 
representations (Wiseheart, Viswanathan, & Bialystok, 2016). This ability might be subserved 
by dynamically forming networks as in the studies by Buschman et al. (2012) and Anzoulatos 
and Miller (2011; 2014).  
Bilinguals regularly have to reconfigure the relations among representations when 
flexibly switching from one language to another. It’s been observed that bilinguals exhibit an 
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enhanced concurrent activation of PFC and striatum in response to tasks requiring such 
reconfiguration (Becker, Prat, & Stocco, 2016). Becker and colleagues (2016) compared the 
performance of monolinguals and bilinguals on a cognitive flexibility task, and applied 
dynamic causal modelling to their functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) data. It was shown 
that in monolinguals, activation of the ACC led to reduced activity in the PFC and striatum, 
while in bilinguals activation of the ACC led to a small increase in prefrontal and striatal 
activity. In an earlier study by Prat and Just (2011), it was shown that in people with higher 
working memory capacity, difficult sentences elicit recruitment of the dorsolateral PFC and 
striatum. Wiseheart et al. (2016) found that bilinguals had an advantage in global switch 
costs, but not in local switch costs, compared to monolinguals. They argue that the local 
switch cost reflects simple task preparation more than online cognitive flexibility, and so they 
conclude that the advantage of bilinguals in global switch costs reflects an advantage in 
executive functions.  
Attentional Control and Mind-Wandering 
In 2002, Corbetta and Shulman proposed a model for explaining how attention is 
controlled in the brain. This model was partly based on earlier models by Posner and Petersen 
(1990), and Mesulam (1981). Earlier research (Desimone & Duncan, 1995) had shown that 
attention is a heightened state of activity in the neurons that code for whatever is being 
attended to, in the appropriate sensory (Heinze et al., 1994; Hillyard, Hink, Schwent, & 
Picton, 1973; Petkov et al., 2004), associative (O’Craven, Downing, & Kanwisher, 1999), or 
even hippocampal (Muzzio et al., 2009) parts of the brain. Ignoring something likewise is 
reflected in an inhibited, or lowered state of activity in the corresponding neurons (Mazaheri 
et al., 2014). In the face of changing goals or changing circumstances, what’s important to 
focus on cannot be immutably hard-wired into us, but must be allowed to change with the 
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situation. The parts of the brain responsible for steering our focus in this way are, according to 
Corbetta and Shulman (2002), the superior parietal lobules, the intraparietal sulci (IPS) and 
the frontal eye fields (FEF), collectively called the Dorsal Attention Network (DAN). These 
areas work in concert to signal to sensory and associative areas of cortex to either increase or 
subdue their activity according to what it is most fitting to attend to at any given moment. It is 
thought that the IPS and the FEF contain priority – or salience – maps of the perceptual space 
a person at any given moment is inhabiting (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), wherein the salience 
of stimuli is affected by a combination of their sensory intensity, learned and/or inborn 
behavioural relevance, and effortful top-down control signals.  
Buschman and Miller (2007) suggest that the IPS is more involved with bottom-up 
attention and that the FEF are more involved with top-down, based on the temporal order they 
become active in the two types of tasks. Recording from several sites, including the FEF and 
the IPS, Buschman and Miller (2009) found that during visual search, the FEF displayed a 
serial activation pattern corresponding to the sequential way in which the animal looked 
through its visual field. This pattern of activity was not found anywhere else. These findings 
suggest that the FEF are directing the IPS during controlled search for a specific stimulus.  
The control of attention seems to work both by enhancing the signals being attended 
to, and by inhibiting the irrelevant signals. Mazaheri et al. (2014) found that making a 
judgement about a stimulus in one modality, while ignoring the other modality, was 
associated with decreases of alpha power in the attended modality’s cortex and increases of 
alpha power in the ignored modality’s cortex. Marshall, O’Shea, Jensen and Bergmann (2015) 
demonstrated that alpha modulations in visual cortex in relation to attention tasks are caused 
by the FEF, when they effectively reduced these by applying transcranial magnetic 
stimulation to the contralateral FEF. Händel, Haarmeier and Jensen (2011) found that amount 
of alpha oscillations in occipital cortex correlated with successful inhibition of attention. 
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Subjects were attending to either the right or the left, and alpha oscillations in the unattended 
hemisphere predicted inability to report stimulus changes on that side. This effect was shown 
to be compromised in adults with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Ter 
Huurne et al., 2013). These findings suggest that successful allocating of attention depend not 
only on paying attention to the right things, but also on not paying attention to the wrong 
things. In addition, the close relationship between oscillations and cognition shows up again 
in attention research.  
Buschman and Miller (2010) observed that shifts of attention were not only 
synchronised to a beta (25 Hz) rhythm, but also that each shift occurred within a single 
oscillatory cycle. In 2009, Siegel and colleagues found that neural ensembles reflecting two 
separate items held in working memory were oscillating out of phase with each other. 
Buschman and Miller (2010) speculate what possible benefits rhythmic oscillations could 
bring. Internal synchrony strengthens the integrity of an ensemble, while external synchrony 
could strengthen the effect that one ensemble has on its output targets through temporal 
summation. Also, if computations are done in discrete, phase-locked packets, then 
computations in one area that depend on computations in a different area can be done more 
efficiently, since the ensembles would «know» when the required computations will be ready 
(Buschman & Miller, 2010). These hypothetical effects of rhythmicity would benefit both 
local and network level processing.  
In Womelsdorf and Everling (2015) the whole process of attentional control is 
described, from motivational and goal-setting computations in the PFC, striatum, and limbic 
structures, to salience maps, search directives, and polymodal spatial representations in the 
FEF, IPS and superior colliculus, before finally fully realising in feature-specific modulations 
in sensory cortices. Here it is also emphasised how synchrony between the different nodes of 
the network underlie the different effects of controlled attention, and indeed how synchrony 
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flexibly produces these networks. Since the salience maps of FEF and IPS depend on 
motivation, goals, and context, these must be able to rapidly update in correspondence with 
top-down signals.  
This DAN had been showing up in several neuroimaging studies (Cabeza & Nyberg, 
2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Kastner, Pinsk, 
De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999), together with a different network that seemed to 
be deactivating concurrently with the DAN’s activating (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Fox et al., 
2005). When performing blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI one needs to use a 
control condition – sometimes called a baseline or resting state – to compare with. Otherwise, 
the sustained activation in task-related areas would be impossible to interpret. However, 
because a living brain is always active (Raichle, 2006), not only is it hard to detect the tiny 
task-related changes, but also when subtracting the baseline activation, sometimes you get 
negative activation (Stark & Squire, 2001). As the baseline can to such a large degree 
influence the activations that are seen, researchers decided to examine the nature and 
organisation of the brain’s resting, or “default”, state (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; Fox et al., 
2005). Knowing which areas are typically active in the resting state, could allow for a more 
conscious design of experimental and control conditions in neuroimaging. What was found is 
a particular set of brain areas consistently deactivating when the subject is engaged in some 
experimental task, with these also consistently coming back online when the subject is not 
engaged in a task. These brain areas include the posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus, the 
medial PFC, and the angular gyrus in the parietal lobe (Fox et al., 2005; Shulman et al., 
1997).  
In 2005, Fox et al. investigated these two networks by calculating correlations in 
BOLD time course between six seed regions previously known to be important nodes in these 
networks, and all other voxels. This was done on images taken of three different resting states. 
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Fox et al.’s (2005) work confirmed that these networks – the DAN and the default mode 
network (DMN) – acted as networks also in the absence of any task. That is, their activity 
within network was correlated, and between network their activity was anticorrelated.  
The DMN has been associated with daydreaming (Kucyi & Davis, 2014), but this does 
not mean that it has no productive function. The network has been found to activate when 
subjects are asked to think about their past, their future, or when taking someone else’s 
perspective, such as when reading a story (Spreng, 2012). Importantly, the DMN has been 
found to activate together with prefrontal control structures when performing a task that both 
involved self-reflection and goal-directed cognition (Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, 
& Schacter, 2010). This was a task where the subject had to create a plan to reach some 
personal goal they had, and to account for obstacles that they might face on the way.  
Executive Functions Broken Down 
 Miyake and Friedman (2012) applied factor analysis to several different tests of 
executive function to try to overcome the problem of «task-impurity», which refers to how in 
every task meant to test executive function, the score additionally reflects non-executive 
abilities particular to the concrete form of the task. An example of such non-executive 
abilities could be colour processing in the Stroop Test. They did this to look for the essential 
components of these elusive constructs. The main constructs they were interested in were 
updating, shifting and inhibition. A certain amount of variance was shared among all three, 
which was termed “Common EF”, and after accounting for this, inhibition contributed no 
further explanation value, so this was dropped as a separate factor. They also found that the 
factors “Common EF” and “Shifting-specific” were anticorrelated in certain situations 
(Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Working memory is an indispensable executive function, which 
in Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) system would cover at least the “Updating-specific” factor, 
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including the ability to store items across a delay, add new items or otherwise change the 
items held. “Shifting-specific” seems to cover the ability to rapidly switch between tasks, or 
set-shifting, but does not fill the requirements of a more comprehensive definition of 
‘cognitive flexibility’. This last construct would probably include all three of Miyake and 
Friedman’s (2012) factors. What’s interesting is that the last factor, “Inhibition”, was 
absorbed by “Common EF”. This means that all tests of executive function require the ability 
to inhibit responses. As mentioned previously, to inhibit a prepotent response, there needs to 
be represented in a person’s mind both a prepotent response, an alternative response, and the 
ability to override one in favour of the other. In addition to this, two other abilities explain 
performance on tests of executive function, according to Miyake and Friedman (2012). One, 
the ability to temporarily store and update the contents of working memory, and two, the 
ability to rapidly switch between tasks. Being able to concentrate and deliberately control 
one’s attention could be supported by the same process underlying inhibiting prepotent 
responses, which means that control of attention and self-control belong to “Common EF”. 
Allowing one’s attention to wander, then, or allowing new thoughts in to the current mindset, 
could be partially explained by the “Shifting-specific” factor. “Updating-specific” probably 
maps pretty cleanly onto the general usage of the term working memory, except maybe for 
“monitoring”. 
The development of tests of executive functions is an important endeavour. These tests 
are central to both the assessment of clinical therapies and basic research into the neural 
underpinnings of executive functions. Tests of executive function may not be testing 
executive functions directly, yet they are presently the best alternative there is. Though there 
are physiological measures able to some degree to predict executive functioning, such as 
event related potentials (ERP), the relation between specific ERPs and behavioural function is 
not always clear (Downes, Bathelt, & De Haan, 2017). The third option is various forms of 
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behavioural observation, which might hold more ecological validity than formal tests, but are 
costly to perform. One formal test of executive function is the WCST, which will be 
discussed next. 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
The WCST was presented by Grant and Berg in 1948. In the article from 1948, Grant 
and Berg used the WCST to investigate the relationship between reinforcement and set-
shifting, reinforcement meaning how many correct responses the subject gave before the 
sorting rule was changed. They found that an increased amount of reinforcing trials did not 
make it harder for the subject to change the sorting rule when they were told their answer was 
no longer correct (Grant & Berg, 1948). In the original WCST four stimulus cards were 
presented to the subject, which had either circles, triangles, crosses or stars, in either a blue, 
green, yellow or red colour, on them. The number of symbols on each card varied between 
one to four. The subject was then handed 64 response cards and asked to place them under the 
stimulus cards according to a rule only known to the investigator – the investigator gave 
feedback on whether the sorting was right or wrong. When the rule changed after a number of 
correct sortings, the subject would have to induce that the rule was changed based on no other 
message than the “wrong”-feedback.  
The subject undergoing the WCST has to perform several different mental operations. 
Initially, the to-be-sorted card must be looked at so that its features, or sorting criteria, can be 
clearly perceived. These then must be compared to the features available among the target 
cards. For the very first card, one of the cards has to be picked at random, while for the 
following cards, the gathered evidence has to be remembered and leveraged for choosing 
optimally. If the card is sorted according to the wrong rule, this has to be noted, and then it 
should exclude one possibility for the next round. If the card is sorted according to the right 
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rule, this rule should be remembered, and attention should be allocated to the perceptual 
feature that is the rule. That is, the subject should scan the cards for a certain colour, shape, or 
number (Gazzaley, Cooney, McEvoy, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2005; Petersen, Corbetta, 
Miezin, & Shulman, 1994). Stated briefly, the WCST challenges working memory, the 
control of attention, cognitive flexibility, and logical deduction. 
Milner (1963) later adapted the WCST to her study, where she compared the 
performance on the test of patients with different brain lesions as a result of operations 
performed to relief the patient of epileptic seizures. She concluded that the test was 
specifically sensitive to lesions in the dorsolateral PFC, and that damage to the posterior 
regions had a lesser impact on performance on the sorting test. Although this view about the 
test has been common for many decades, conflicting evidence was provided by Teuber, 
Battersby, and Bender already in 1951. They had administered the test to wounded soldiers, 
and their results showed that the soldiers that performed the worst were those with parieto-
occipital lesions, and not frontal lesions. Anderson, Damasio, Jones, and Tranel (1991) 
investigated this disparity more closely, and concluded that though the test was somewhat 
sensitive to frontal lesions, it was not sufficiently specific to be used as a sole indicator of the 
presence or absence of frontal lesions.  
It would seem, then, that there isn’t a dedicated “card sorting centre” in the brain. 
Lesion studies report effects on performance on the WCST by damage in a number of foci, 
including the dorsolateral PFC (Milner, 1963; Stuss et al. 2000), the medial PFC (Drewe, 
1974), the temporal lobes (Giovagnoli, 2001), the hippocampus (Igarashi et al., 2002), and 
even the cerebellum (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2008). Neuroimaging studies have been no less 
ambiguous, with most of them reporting task related metabolic increases in a distributed 
network of brain areas (Nyhus & Barceló, 2009). In a field made up of complex cognitive 
functions where there is rarely a simple relation between construct, behavioural measure, and 
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neural substrate, it would seem that the WCST manages to stand out as involving a more 
complex set of constructs. 
In addition to the unclear relationship between WCST performance and underlying 
cognitive abilities, and the unclear relationship between these cognitive abilities and their 
underlying neural structures, there seems also to be ambiguities in the scoring of the WCST. 
Heaton (1981) published a formalised manual for the administration, scoring and 
interpretation of the results. The rules included here were that the number of key cards should 
be four and the number of cards in the response deck should be 128. The sorting rule should 
change after ten consecutive correct matches. The performance should be measured using 
sixteen different scales. Many researchers report divergence from these rules (Nyhus & 
Barceló, 2009; Mountain & Snow, 1993), however, and the scoring system in particular is 
often simplified. Bowden et al. (1998) investigated the reliability and internal validity of the 
WCST. They concluded that the different scores all load onto one factor, and that the 
reliability of the test was so low that clinicians ought not to use it until this had improved.  
The variability in the way the WCST is administered makes comparing results from 
different studies less convenient. The involvement of a complex set of cognitive functions and 
brain areas in solving the tasks makes drawing conclusions from test performance 
complicated. Despite these issues, the test continues to be popular. A meta-analysis done in 
2003 by Demakis found that the test is indeed sensitive to frontal damage compared to 
damage in other parts of the brain. Stuss et al. (2000) compared WCST-performance among 
persons with focal lesions in frontal and non-frontal brain areas, while excluding persons with 
language comprehension problems and/or detectable neglect. They found that the patients 
with damage in the frontal areas were significantly impaired, mainly due to perseverative 
errors and set loss errors.  
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Persons with frontal lesions are not the only ones with dysexecutive symptoms. Below 
follows a discussion of the many ways dopamine drives executive functions in light of several 
conditions characterised by both dopamine dysregulation and dysexecutive symptoms. 
Dopamine and Executive Functions 
Many patient groups are known to have problems with executive functions, including 
persons with schizophrenia (Orellana & Slachevsky, 2013), ADHD (Martel, Nikolas, & Nigg, 
2007), addiction (Verdejo-García, Bechara, Recknor, & Pérez-García, 2006), and persons 
with Parkinson’s disease. People with Parkinson’s disease are moderately to severely 
impaired on the WCST (Lange, Brückner, Knebel, Seer, & Kopp, 2018). The catecholamine 
dopamine has been implicated in many conditions in which executive functions also are said 
to be disrupted. These include ADHD (Volkow et al., 2009), substance abuse (Berridge & 
Robinson, 2016), Parkinson’s disease (Fahn, 2008), and schizophrenia (Howes, McCutcheon, 
& Stone, 2015). Although dopamine can have many different effects, depending among other 
things upon concentration, receptor density or which structures are involved (Cools & 
D’Esposito, 2011; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008), it seems worthwhile to explore what 
possible commonalities exist, given that a single molecule can have such wide ranging 
effects.  
Dopamine is distributed through three pathways in the brain; 1) mesolimbic, from the 
ventral tegmental area to the nucleus accumbens 2) mesocortical, from the ventral tegmental 
area to the frontal cortex 3) nigrostriatal, from the substantia nigra to the striatum (Wickens, 
2009). The mesolimbic pathway is associated with reward and motivation, and is implicated 
in addiction (Berridge & Robinson, 2016). The nigrostriatal is associated with motor action 
selection, and is implicated in Parkinson’s disease (Fahn, 2008). The mesocortical pathway is 
less understood, but it has been hypothesised that dysfunction in this pathway is what’s 
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causing the cognitive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia, and so would be involved in 
executive and social functioning (Weinstein et al., 2017). 
Dopamine and Motivation. One of the earliest discoveries about dopamine’s 
functions was its role in reward and reinforcement. It should be noted, however, that 
dopamine wasn’t yet found to be a neurotransmitter when the first discoveries were made 
(Carlsson, Lindqvist, Magnusson, & Waldeck, 1958). It was found that rats were willing to 
work very hard for the reward of having their mesolimbic pathway electrically stimulated 
(Olds & Milner, 1954), which prompted researchers to conclude that this molecule mediated 
feelings of pleasure. In the same vein, rats were also found to be motivated to acquire 
dopaminergic drugs (Pickens & Harris, 1968). The idea that dopamine equated to pleasure 
was modified later, when “wanting” and “liking” were found to be dissociable (Berridge, 
Venier, & Robinson, 1989). Dopamine in the mesolimbic pathway is now mostly thought to 
underlie motivation (Berridge & Robinson, 2016), although the experience of feeling 
motivated might still be enjoyable in and of itself (Healy, 1989). In a review by Robbins and 
Everitt (1992), two different roles for dopamine are reported in the same brain area, the 
striatum. Blocking dopamine action in the ventral striatum, either through dopamine 
antagonists or through lesions, leads to a state very much like avolition, where the rats don’t 
seek out rewards, like food or mates. Blocking dopamine action in the dorsal striatum, on the 
other hand, seems to abolish the actual consuming of rewards once they are acquired. These 
effects have been doubly dissociated, with rats working for food, but not eating it, and rats not 
working for food, but eating it if placed in front of them (Robbins & Everitt, 1992). Even 
here, we can see that two separable functions, seeking and consuming, still have one thing in 
common, that they both are directed towards rewards. Salamone, Cousins, and Snyder (1997) 
state that “rewards” is not exactly what dopamine is signalling in the mesolimbic pathway, 
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but rather motivational salience in general. This means that dopamine supplies the incentive 
not only to approach pleasurable stimuli, but also the incentive to avoid aversive ones.  
The dorsal striatum, which is the target of the nigrostriatal pathway, has since been 
found to underlie associative learning, habit formation, and motor sequence gating (Yin & 
Knowlton, 2006). Using Antzoulatos and Miller’s (2011; 2014) experiments on category 
learning in macaques as an example, one might imagine that the striatum was learning what to 
do about some pictures to get treats. Perhaps in the beginning it was mapping to each 
individual picture a response that would be good. As more and more new pictures were shown 
to it, the striatum started feeding the PFC all these individual truths, and then the PFC started 
extracting the similarities among all the “look left”-pictures and all the “look-right”-pictures, 
until, in return, it could teach the striatum to ignore the irrelevant differences making the 
pictures unique, and instead only focus on whatever features made the categories what they 
were, and then simply respond as if there were only two pictures. One important thing to point 
out here is that the PFC was only able to extrapolate the categories from the individual 
pictures because there was some commonalities to extrapolate.  
Executive Functioning and Dopamine. Dopamine was also found to play a role in 
executive functions when rhesus monkeys with a regional depletion of dopamine were 
impaired in a delay task (Brozoski, Brown, Rosvold, & Goldman, 1979). Cools and 
D’Esposito (2011) propose that dopamine is central to working memory function, but that the 
optimal concentrations lie in the middle of an inverted U-shaped curve. Because of this, they 
suggest that the baseline levels of dopamine should be taken into account when investigating 
the effects of dopaminergic medication on cognitive abilities. Another proposal in Cools and 
D’Esposito (2011) was that dopamine has opposing effects on the PFC versus the striatum, 
partly motivated by the difference in distribution of D1 versus D2 receptors. Durstewitz and 
Seamans (2008) also proposed different effects of dopamine on cognition, depending on the 
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balance between D1 and D2 binding. They didn’t connect this difference to brain structure, 
though, and instead suggested that there were certain dopamine concentrations more 
amenable to D1-binding and others more amenable to D2-binding.  
In a study by Puig and Miller (2014), it was found that blocking D2-receptors in the 
monkey lateral PFC impaired associative learning, cognitive flexibility (operationalised as 
number of perseverative errors), and motivation. In 2012, Puig and Miller had shown that 
blocking D1-receptors impaired associative learning and cognitive flexibility. There was, 
however, an imbalanced distribution of reduction in associative learning and flexibility, where 
D1-blocking had a stronger effect on learning, while D2-blocking had a stronger effect on 
flexibility. Puig and Miller (2014) suggested that this could indicate that D1 activation is 
involved in maintaining a representation, while D2 activation “destabilizes PFC network 
states favoring the exploration of new strategies” (Puig & Miller, 2014, p. 2985).  
Dopamine has been shown to influence task performance through a modulation of the 
DMN (Nagano-Saito, Liu, Doyon, & Dagher, 2009; Dang et al., 2012). In Nagano-Saito and 
colleagues’ (2009) study, administration of a dopamine receptor agonist made reductions in 
DMN activity sensitive to task complexity, so that increasing task complexity resulted in 
larger reductions in DMN activity. In Dang and colleagues’ (2012) study, higher dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the striatum was correlated with lower performance in shifting among 
object features and a weaker reduction of DMN activity. Whether the study by Dang et al. 
(2012) shows that dopamine is beneficial or detrimental to task performance is equivocal, as a 
higher synthesis capacity is only one aspect of dopamine transmission (Berry et al., 2018; 
Nour, McCutcheon, & Howes, 2018). 
Methylphenidate and dextroamphetamine work by enhancing dopamine action – these 
substances are both prescribed to persons who suffer from ADHD (Seeman & Madras, 2002), 
a condition characterised by impulsivity, hyperactivity and inattentiveness (American 
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Psychiatric Association, 2013). Given the dopaminergic medications’ ability to improve these 
symptoms, it would seem dopamine somehow aids in concentration and willpower. Whether 
it does this by increasing the motivational salience of tasks or whether it does it by 
strengthening control processes’ ability to control, is not known. One group of people who do 
not benefit from dopamine agonists, are those suffering from schizophrenia.  
Dopamine – The Point to Cognition. Dopamine plays a central role in motivating 
behaviour, i.e. it drives a person’s goals. It drives the feeling of importance that behaviourally 
relevant activities have. It also is central to a very basic form of learning, where whatever one 
learns, the dopaminergic “value” of it is also automatically encoded. Though not everything 
one learns is necessarily associated with a dopaminergic valence (Tolman, 1948), things that 
are interesting or that feel important (i.e. things that have been associated with reinforcement) 
are learned faster and better (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Treviño, 2016). For these reasons, 
not only is the fast, concrete learning of the basal ganglia enhanced by the right 
concentrations of dopamine, but also the PFC, when trying to maintain something in working 
memory, or staying focused on a task, or trying to inhibit an inappropriate response in favour 
of the more effortful one, is afforded some extra horsepower by dopamine. The strange thing 
is that it is also dopamine that creates the obstacles for the PFC to do its job. When trying to 
stay focused on a task, it is the salience of distracting stimuli that must be overcome, and it is 
dopamine that imbued those stimuli with salience. Normally, the salience of things arises 
organically. Some fundamental things like food or people are salient because they are 
inherently relevant to one’s existence, while other things like a well-equipped kitchen or a 
telephone become salient through their association with food and people, respectively. In 
psychosis, however, salience seems to be transferred to stimuli in a chaotic manner (Kapur, 
2003). 
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Dopamine in Schizophrenia. The final function of dopamine to be discussed here is 
not really a function, but rather a dysfunction. Psychosis is defined as a loss of connection 
with external reality. Symptoms include delusions, hallucinations, and disordered thought and 
speech (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Psychosis is probably the most 
recognisable feature of schizophrenia, an illness that is also characterised by disorganised 
speech, disorganised behaviour, and negative symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Most pharmacological treatment options for psychosis since the 1950s have been 
antagonistic to dopamine in some way (Howes et al., 2015). This made researchers think that 
dopamine was central to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia (Baumeister & Francis, 2002). 
Although the causes of the condition are not fully understood, most of the theories 
surrounding schizophrenia assume dopamine dysregulation at some point in the causal chain 
(Corcoran, Mujica-Parodi, Yale, Leitman, & Malaspina, 2002; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Howes 
et al., 2015; Javitt, 2010; Kapur, 2003). Instead of trying to understand the underlying cause 
of schizophrenia, this section will focus on attempts at explaining the role of dopamine in 
schizophrenia and psychosis.  
One theory postulates that psychosis is caused by excessive amounts of dopamine in 
the striatum, and is called the “aberrant salience hypothesis” (Kapur, 2003). Kapur (2003) 
illustrates how excess dopamine imbues normally inconsequential thoughts and stimuli with 
an increased sense of importance, or motivational salience. The idea is then that this abrupt 
sense of importance invites the person with schizophrenia to supply fanciful accounts 
explaining the warped motivational salience of thoughts and environment. Dopamine 
antagonists, then, relaxes this salience and creates some «motivational room» where the 
delusions are allowed to subside and resolve. Kapur (2003) underscores, however, that the 
antipsychotics do not directly dissolve the delusions as if by a supplement of pharmacological 
clarity, they only reduce their salience which creates space for alternative thoughts to emerge. 
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If the delusions are not addressed cognitively during pharmacological treatment, de novo 
psychosis post-treatment often revolves around the same subjects as the original psychosis. 
There have been reports that prognosis worsens with time passed between the first 
episode of psychosis and treatment (Harrison et al., 2001). Seen within the parameters of 
Kapur’s (2003) theory, this might be reflecting a process of learning. Recall that the striatum 
recognises and learns the association between concrete phenomena and their dopaminergic 
value. When in a psychotic state, the dopaminergic value of phenomena is aberrant, according 
to Kapur (2003). The longer it takes before an individual receives treatment, the more time 
the striatum has to learn all these aberrant associations. This would contribute to consolidating 
a very different and fundamentally disordered experience of the world. Assuming that the 
PFC depends on the striatum for reliable and coherent streams of experiences to be able to 
draw out the essences and generalise, a protracted psychosis could disrupt the very basis of 
abstract thought. This would make it hard to recover via cognitive behavioural therapy, for 
instance. In addition, relating to other people would become progressively more difficult, as 
communication relies on an enormous amount of shared assumptions about the world and 
about what’s important in life.  
A possible trajectory from an untreated psychosis towards worsening cognitive 
symptoms was outlined above. However, there have also been reports stating that the 
cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia precede the first episode of psychosis (Caspi et al., 
2003). Findings like these make it difficult to determine the direction of causality between 
psychosis and cognitive symptoms. It is still striking that all of the symptoms of 
schizophrenia can be predicted from various abnormalities in dopamine concentration 
(Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008). 
 People with schizophrenia do not only suffer from psychotic symptoms. The disorder 
is also characterized by negative symptoms which refer to an impairment in normal 
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functioning. The negative symptoms include symptoms related to motivation – avolition, 
asociality and anhedonia – and affect that is blunted, and alogia (Kirkpatrick, Fenton, 
Carpenter, & Marder, 2006). In addition, people with schizophrenia also show deficits in 
executive functions, such as working memory (Forbes, Carrick, McIntosh, & Lawrie, 2009; 
Lee & Park, 2005) and attention (Mesholam-Gately, Giuliano, Goff, Faraone, & Seidman, 
2009). Everett, Lavoie, Gagnon, and Gosselin (2001) report from an experiment comparing 
patients with schizophrenia with controls in the WCST, that the patients with schizophrenia 
made significantly more errors and completed fewer categories. They report that the patients 
with schizophrenia did more perseverative errors, but they also report that considerably more 
trials were needed for them to complete the first category, so their impairment wasn’t 
necessarily specific to perseveration.  
 Using Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) system, what seems to be the issue in the 
schizophrenic brain is an overabundance of “Shifting”, where anything can seem important 
and grab attention. Whether this is in a direct causal relationship with an impoverished 
“Common EF” (inhibition), or if these two features develop in parallel is not clear from the 
research discussed here, though Miyake and Friedman (2012) did point out that these two 
factors were anticorrelated in certain situations. It seems likely, though, that if everything and 
anything can seem important, then this would have an antagonistic relation to the ability to 
deliberately choose one response or thought over another. One could easily conceive how this 
imbalance between shifting and inhibition could lead to avolition. If avolition is defined by 
the lack of motivation to achieve goals, and the way this motivation is represented by the 
brain looks like what Holroyd and Yeung (2012) described, with the ACC setting up a 
hierarchy of salience, basically, then this hierarchy would be impossible to construct if 
anything can seem equally important. This would quite effectively disrupt any long-term 
plans. 
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Kapur (2003) proposes that aberrant salience explains both hallucinations, delusions, 
and disordered thought and speech. These symptoms by themselves seem likely to explain the 
negative and cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia, but the way antipsychotics reduce the 
positive symptoms while not impacting the negative ones (Remington et al., 2016), challenges 
this very intuitive understanding.  
Schizophrenia remains a mysterious condition with several observations that are 
difficult to integrate into one coherent, aetiological theory (Harper, Towers-Evans, & 
MacCabe, 2015). Although the hallucinations and delusions may be the most recognisable 
symptoms, it is actually the cognitive symptoms that have the most profound impact on the 
patient’s life (Green, Kern, & Heaton, 2004; Green, 2006; Bliksted, Videbech, Fagerlund, & 
Frith, 2017). In order to study these, and eventually develop better treatment options, good 
neuropsychological tests are needed. Such tests should be challenging enough to distinguish 
between healthy and patients, while also being sufficiently specific to distinguish between 
different functions. Therefore, it is relevant to uncover exactly which neural structures are 
being engaged by the tests already created. One attempt at this will be described below.  
Experimental Design  
The aim of the study was to develop an auditory adaptation of the WCST, which 
would allow for testing of the visually impaired. The second aim was to explore the 
commonality between the auditory and visual variants of the test, investigating the neural 
substrates of performing the WCST when maintenance of information in short-term memory 
was controlled for. In this study, four different versions of the WCST were used. These could 
be categorised by modality and difficulty level. In the visual modality, there was one original 
WCST, called “Uninstructed Visual”, and one where the subject was informed of the sorting 
rule of the WCST, called “Instructed Visual”. The pattern was the same for the auditory 
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modality. The translation from the visual to the auditory modality was done as follows. 
Instead of decorated cards as stimuli, the subjects were to perform the sorting tasks on speech 
recordings as stimuli. The stimuli varied along three dimensions – voice actor, syllable, and 
number of repetitions. The design and execution of the experiment was done by Professor 
Karsten Specht, while the processing and analysis of the data were performed by the author. 
The following were the hypotheses of the study: 
1) Comparing the visual task with the auditory task will only show differences in sensory 
cortex. 
2) Comparing the uninstructed sorting task with the instructed sorting task will show 
activation more specifically related to executive functions, such as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate and parietal cortex. 
3) Comparing average activation across all tasks with rest will show more activation 
related to working memory, possibly in posterior cortex. 
Methods 
Subjects 
16 healthy, male subjects between the ages of 19 and 29 participated in the study. 
They were all right handed as determined by the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), and 
were naïve to the WCST. Informed consent was acquired from every subject, and the regional 
ethics committee approved the study.  
Materials 
The Edinburgh Inventory. The Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was 
administered to determine the handedness of the subjects. This inventory includes 15 items 
asking for the subject’s preferred hand to use in different circumstances.  
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3T GE-Signa MRI Scanner. When performing fMRI the BOLD signal is utilized. 
This is an MR-signal that occurs as a result of how the magnetic properties of deoxygenated 
and oxygenated blood differ (Lindquist, 2008). When haemoglobin, which is a metalloprotein 
in the red blood cells, is oxygenated it is diamagnetic, which means that the magnetic force 
repels it. When the oxygen in the haemoglobin is released, it is paramagnetic, which means 
that the magnetic force attracts it. Since there is no oxygen stored inside the neurons, more 
active neurons require more blood. The blood supply in one area is depleted of its oxygen 
faster, when groups of neurons in the area become more active. This leads to a reaction in the 
blood vessels, and they expand. This generates an increased blood flow, and as a result more 
oxygenated blood is sent to the activated group of neurons, which is named the 
heamodynamic response function (HRF) (Lindquist, 2008). The whole process is registered 
by the MR-scanner as a slight reduction in signal right after an area becomes more active, 
swiftly followed by a rising signal strength as the balance between oxygenated and 
deoxygenated blood shifts. Signal strength peaks in most cases at 4-6 seconds after the 
neurons start firing. However, the BOLD-signal can be difficult to detect. The brain is always 
active, and the activity that is evoked when the subject is performing experimental tasks, is 
only a tiny fraction of the overall activity of the brain. To solve this issue, the task or 
behaviour that is to be mapped to a brain area often is repeated multiple times to get an 
increased signal-to-noise ratio. The activation of the target behaviour is recorded along with 
repeated blocks of a control condition. The activation pattern of the control condition is then 
subtracted from the activation of the experimental condition, and it is assumed that the neural 
activity that remains after this subtraction is the activity related to the behaviour of interest 
particularly. This procedure is called cognitive subtraction. A scanner trigger was used to 
allow for coordination between the image acquisition and stimulus presentations.  
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Stimuli Presentation. The auditory stimuli were presented through headphones from 
Nordic Neuro Lab (NNL), which also allowed for two-way communication between subject 
and staff. At the same time the headphones shielded the subjects from high noise levels 
coming from the scanner. The visual stimuli and instructions were displayed on an LCD 
screen, also from NNL. The subjects submitted their responses by pressing the buttons on an 
input unit, also from NNL.  
Stimuli Production. Audio recording and editing was performed with the computer 
software Adobe Audition 2.0, while the four versions of the WCST were created together 
with their presentation order in the computer software E-prime (version 1.1, Psychology 
Software Tools Inc.). E-prime allows for synchronisation between the scanner and the 
presentation of stimuli, through the use of triggers and markers.  
SPM12. Statistical parametric mapping (SPM12) is a set of statistical procedures 
developed by Friston et al. (1994) to analyse neuroimaging data in an experimental setting, 
i.e. to test specific hypotheses. It involves assuming parametric statistical models at each 
voxel, which when tested according to whichever hypothesis one has, results in a map 
showing all voxels that do or do not conform to the hypothesised pattern of activation. A 
software tool designed to implement these procedures was developed by the Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience.  
MRIcroGL. Figures showing the activations were made by importing contrast maps 
from SPM12 into MRIcroGL (v1.0.20180623) This software then projected the activations on 
a 3D-rendered model of the brain. MRIcroGL was developed by the McClausland Center of 
University of South Carolina.  
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Design 
The experimental design included two factors with two levels each. The factors were 
labelled “Difficulty” and “Modality”. “Difficulty” had the levels “Instructed” and 
“Uninstructed”, while “Modality” had the levels “Visual” and “Auditory”. Altogether, this 
yielded four different tasks that the subjects were presented with. There were two runs per 
subject, one for each modality. Within each run, blocks of the instructed and the uninstructed 
sorting task were presented in an intermingled fashion. Each task block lasted 60 seconds, 
with 20 second periods of no task in between. In total, there were 24 task blocks, and 12 per 
run. 
Procedure 
The paradigm was built in E-prime (version 1.1). Prior to running the experiment, the 
paradigm was tested in a pilot study done on five subjects. 
Uninstructed Tasks. Two experimental tasks were used. The visual sorting task was 
adapted from the original WCST. In this task, two cards with different symbols, in different 
colours and numbers, were shown following each other. The symbols were either circles, 
squares, stars or triangles; the colours of the symbols were red, blue, green and yellow. The 
number of symbols on each card ranged between one to four. The subjects were to deduce 
what the mutual feature of the presented cards was. To figure this out they would have to try 
different sorting rules, and succeed or fail. The E-Prime program communicated through a 
response screen whether their answer was right, and the subjects had to make changes in their 
sorting rule based on this feedback. When a subject found the right sorting rule, he or she was 
to follow this rule for the following trials. However, this rule changed at each new task block 
in the experiment. When the feedback on the response screen communicated that their choice 
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was now incorrect, the subject would have to adjust their choice of sorting rule and find the 
new correct rule.  
The auditory uninstructed sorting task was an original adaptation of the WCST created 
for the present study, named the Auditory Sorting Task (AST). In the AST, the stimuli to be 
sorted are speech recordings, which vary along three dimensions: syllable (ba, da, pa, ta), 
voice (four different actors), and number of repetitions (one to four). As only the stimuli are 
different between the auditory and the visual task, the AST also follows the delayed matching 
procedure described above. The recordings were captured in Adobe Audition 2.0, inside of an 
echo reduced chamber. Four different male actors read aloud from a list of syllables. During 
the recording, the actors read each syllable several times from a list, and the order of the 
syllables was varied, so that there were no systematic differences in intonation between the 
syllables. The recordings that sounded most neutral and homogeneous in intonation were 
chosen as stimuli for the AST.  
Instructed Tasks. The instructed tasks mirror the two tasks described above, except 
for the inclusion of a message ahead of every task block informing the subject of which 
stimulus feature to attend to. As this obviates the need to test one sorting rule while 
maintaining another rule as a possibility, it was thought that this would be less taxing on the 
executive system. If used as a high level control condition, it was hypothesised that this would 
remove activation related to simple storage of short-term information – as this would be 
functions common to both tasks. What would then be left was thought to be activation related 
to executive functions like set shifting.  
Data Acquisition. Each subject was in the scanner for two runs, once for the visual 
tasks and once for the auditory tasks. The experimental conditions were introduced to the 
subjects prior to entering the scanner, and so they were aware of the variety of sorting 
dimensions. However, they were not explicitly told about how the rules would change. One 
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half of the subjects began with the visual task and the other half began with the auditory task, 
in order to control for learning effects. The subjects were instructed to respond using remote 
controls as to whether two consecutively presented stimuli were the same or not the same 
along the presently applicable dimension. One half of the subjects responded “yes” with their 
right hand while responding “no” with their left hand, and this configuration was reversed for 
the other half of the subjects. Each block in both runs was preceded by a task instruction 
presented on a screen. The visual tasks were shown on the same screen, while the auditory 
tasks were delivered through headphones.  
The data were collected with a 3T GE-Signa MRI scanner. A structural T1-weighted 
image was taken of every subject. The functional images were taken with a T2*-weighting in 
combination with echo-planar imaging. The presentation of stimuli was synchronised with the 
acquisition of the functional images through triggers sent between the scanner and the 
computer running E-prime. 360 whole-brain volumes were gathered in each run. The 
repetition time (TR) was 2.5 seconds, and gaps of one second were left in between the TRs to 
reduce noise when presenting the auditory stimuli. The acquisition time (TA) was 1.5 
seconds. A non-cubic voxel size of 1.72×1.72×4.40 was used within a 64×64 matrix. 
Preprocessing and Statistical Analyses 
Preprocessing and analyses were done using the SPM12 software package (Wellcome 
Centre for Human Neuroimaging, 2014) within MATLAB 9.4 (The MathWorks Inc., 2018). 
The time-series was realigned to the first image, and then unwarped to compensate for 
deformations around air-tissue interfaces. These were then normalised to fit the coordinate 
system of Montreal Neurological Institute, and re-sampled to a voxel size of 2 mm3. Finally, 
the images were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 8 mm to satisfy the assumptions 
of subsequent statistical analyses.  
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The two sessions (auditory and visual) of each participant were modelled separately in 
a blocked design. The canonical HRF was used with no derivatives. Responses were not 
included in the model, but realignment parameters were. The data were filtered with a high-
pass filter of 450 seconds. Contrasts were estimated for the main effects of the experimental 
condition and the instructed condition, as well as the latter's effect subtracted from the 
former's effect. 
Looking at the group effects, a within-subject factorial analysis of variance with 
Modality and Difficulty being the factors was performed. These had two levels each; Visual 
and Auditory, and Instructed and Uninstructed. The contrasts of interest were the main effects 
of the factors, unique effects of Uninstructed versus Instructed, and positive effect of 
condition (average vs. baseline). A conjunction analysis testing against the global null 
hypothesis was performed on the contrast Uninstructed minus Instructed, because of 
suspected undue influence of Modality-specific variance. A threshold of P < 0.05 (FWE-
corrected) was applied to correct for multiple comparisons. Extent threshold was 15. 
Short Explanations of Preprocessing and Analysis Procedures.  
Slice Time Correction. The images resulting from an fMRI-scan are of vertical and 
horizontal slices of the brain, and these images can’t be registered from the whole brain 
simultaneously. This means that between an image of a slice of the bottom of the brain, and 
an image of a slice of the top of the brain, there might be a delay. This needs to be corrected 
to perform analyses of the resulting images. To correct this one can use calculations to see the 
resulting images as if they were registered simultaneously. One way to do this is by temporal 
interpolation, which involves estimating the BOLD signal from what it was just before or just 
after. Another way is through something called phase shift, which involves moving the whole 
time series so that it aligns with a reference slice, for example the middle slice. 
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Realignment and Unwarping. When registering images in an MR-machine, different 
sources can produce noise that affects the results. Head movement during fMRI is a noise-
source that can have a significant impact on the results. Due to head movement, the voxels 
that cover the brain tissue in one area at one point in time could be covering a different area of 
the brain at another point in time. To perform analyses of the brain images one has to correct 
eventual head movements’ impact. This problem is solved by realigning all the obtained 
images of one individual brain, to the first registered image of the current individual. This is 
done by rotating the image, translation of the image, scaling, and shearing. Nonlinear 
transformations, which in this case are called unwarping, are also needed in some cases, 
because of the magnetic field being warped by air-tissue interfaces. 
Co-registration. The fMRI images are also warped to fit the dimensions of a structural 
image, so that the structural image can be used as a background for the activations. This can 
aid in determining the location of ambiguous activations in single subjects. 
Normalization. Every individual brain is built so that they are all unique. This leads to 
voxels not representing the same brain tissue areas when performing fMRI on different brains. 
This represents a problem when working with data obtained from several different subjects, 
and to solve this, the images of every brain has to be warped so that they fit a coordinate 
system that is common for all the imaged brains. The Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
has created one such coordinate system, called the MNI space. Several normal MR brain 
images were combined to create this system (Collins, Neelin, Peters & Evans, 1994). 
Spatial Filtering. Spatial filtering, or spatial smoothing, is the final step in the 
preprocessing of the images. The process of normalising several brains to a single mould 
sometimes leaves residual differences and abrupt borders. These have to be smoothed out in 
order to satisfy the distributional assumptions of later statistical analyses. Even though this 
reduces the images´ spatial resolution, it may also increase the signal-to-noise ratio. 
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After Preprocessing. When fully preprocessed, the images are ready to be analysed. 
First, the images are analysed on a subject to subject, and scanning session by scanning 
session, basis. The first step is to assume a general linear model (GLM) at each individual 
voxel which describes the variation in signal strength across time in terms of the experimental 
conditions, known sources of noise and residual error. This model can be expressed as the 
following equation, Y=Xβ+ε. In the present experiment, there were 8 regressors, two for each 
experimental condition (instructed sorting and uninstructed sorting) and six realignment 
parameters which controlled for head movement. The experimental conditions were 
convolved with the HRF, which accommodates a more natural shape in the BOLD curve 
instead of an abrupt on and off. Since a blocked design was used, there was no need to 
explore more specific convolutions, as these would not be visible anyway across such 
timespans. The betas, or regression coefficients, were estimated using the information known 
to the researcher, such as the onsets of the different experimental blocks and the recorded 
BOLD signal. Looking for the configuration resulting in the least amount of error, SPM12 
calculated the estimated contribution weight of each regressor at each voxel at each timepoint. 
This resulted in a number of maps equal to the number of regressors, with each map showing 
the contributions of one regressor for every voxel in the brain. These maps could then be 
contrasted against each other in different ways, resulting in contrast maps showing for 
example which voxels activated more to condition A versus condition B. The contrasts in 
each voxel could then be tested against the null hypothesis, allowing for inferences about 
causality to be made. Since there were being done tests in numbers proportional to every 
single voxel in the brain, a strict threshold for statistical significance had to be set, to control 
for false positives. The two main approaches to correcting for multiple tests are the 
familywise error rate (FWE) correction and the false discovery rate (FDR) correction. FWE 
controls the rate of any false positives across the whole set of tests performed, while FDR 
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controls the ratio of false positives to false negatives, and so FWE is the more stringent of the 
two. In the present experiment, a version of FWE was used that accounted for the fact that 
most voxels in the brain are correlated with other voxels to some degree, which means that 
the number of truly independent tests is lower than the number of voxels. The FWE-alpha was 
set to 0.05. When the relevant contrast maps for each scanning session for each subject were 
acquired, group analysis, or second level GLM, could commence. The contrast maps of 
interest for each subject were added to a second level GLM which now had a new regressor, 
namely the variance between subjects. The contrast maps used were simply of which voxels 
were significantly more active under Uninstructed Sorting compared to baseline, and which 
voxels were significantly more active under Instructed Sorting compared to baseline. These 
came in two sets, namely Visual and Auditory. From these, a 2x2 analysis of variance was 
performed, allowing for detection of main effects of Modality and of Difficulty, as well as 
interaction effects.  
Results 
The main effect of Modality was seen only in voxels at auditory and visual cortices. A 
pair of clusters stretching from the lateral edges of middle and superior temporal gyrus to the 
posterior insula and central operculum, bilaterally. Another band of activation is seen across 

















Figure 1. Main effect of Modality. A: Inferior aspect, B: Posterior aspect. 
 
 
The Uninstructed minus the Instructed condition, showed bilateral activation across 
inferior occipital gyrus and occipital fusiform gyrus, extending ventrally to the cerebellum 
Table 1     
Main effect of Modality 
Cluster  Voxel  Anatomical location 
p(FWE) Size  p(FWE) F Z  x y z Area 
0.000 2786  0.000 114.43 7.71  -52 -20 0 Left superior 
temporal 
gyrus 
0.000 2126  0.000 111.56 7.65  66 -22 0 Right superior 
temporal 
gyrus 
0.000 843  0.000 60.49 6.24  6 -84 -10 Right lingual 
gyrus 
0.000 247  0.000 58.22 6.15  -36 -70 -18 Left occipital 
fusiform 
gyrus 
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and medially to the lingual gyrus. There was also a blotch of activation at the medial center of 
supplementary motor area (SMA), as well as bilateral activation at precentral gyrus, on the 
edge of middle frontal gyrus. In addition there was bilateral activation at parietal lobules, 
supramarginal gyrus and angular gyrus. There was also some activation at the right superior 













 Figure 2. Uninstructed minus Instructed. A: Left aspect, B: Right aspect. 
 
Table 2 
Uninstructed minus Instructed 





T Z  x y z Area 
0.000 1372  0.000 9.29 7.15  28 -90 -8 Right occipital 
fusiform gyrus, right 
inferior occipital gyrus 
0.000 1087  0.000 8.91 6.96  -20 -90 -14 Left occipital fusiform 
gyrus 
0.000 561  0.000 7.69 6.29  -30 -54 42 Left superior parietal 
lobule 
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motor cortex 
0.000 271  0.000 6.95 5.85  42 8 34 Right middle frontal 
gyrus 
0.000 222  0.001 6.29 5.43  60 -24 0 Right superior temporal 
gyrus 
0.000 306  0.001 6.29 5.42  -42 4 28 Left precentral gyrus 
0.001 75  0.004 5.81 5.10  34 24 -2 Right anterior insula 
0.010 23  0.004 5.78 5.07  -52 10 -8 Left temporal pole 
0.006 33  0.005 5.7 5.02  -30 28 -2 Left orbital inferior 
frontal gyrus 
0.000 196  0.006 5.65 4.99  38 -48 38 Right angular gyrus, 
right superior parietal 
lobule 
0.014 16  0.017 5.31 4.74  48 -22 -10 Right middle temporal 
gyrus 
 
In comparison, the Instructed minus the Uninstructed condition revealed almost 
exclusively activation in the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. See Table 3, and see 
Figure 3 for combined map of activations exclusive to Uninstructed and activations exclusive 









Figure 3. Green: Instructed minus Uninstructed, Red: Uninstructed minus Instructed. 
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Table 3 
Instructed minus Uninstructed 
Cluster  Voxel  Anatomical location 
p(FWE) Size  p(FWE) T Z  x y z Area 
0.000 1105  0.000 7.74 6.32  6 -58 22 Right 
precuneus 
 
0.001 99  0.000 7.59 6.23  -44 -78 24 Left middle 
occipital 
gyrus 
0.001 76  0.000 6.60 5.62  0 62 -2 Frontal pole 
 




After applying the conjunction analysis to the Uninstructed minus Instructed contrast, 
a much cleaner version of the same pattern was seen, with clear activation centres at SMA, 
and bilaterally at FEF, IPS, and occipital fusiform gyrus. See Table 4 and Figure 4. 
 
Table 4 
Conjunction analysis of Uninstructed minus Instructed 
Cluster  Voxel  Anatomical location 
p(FWE) Size  p(FWE) T Z  x y z Area 
0.000 131  0.000 6.09 7.77  28 -92 -10 Right occipital 
fusiform gyrus 
0.000 149  0.000 5.39 7.09  -26 -92 -16 Left occipital 
fusiform gyrus 
0.000 574  0.000 5.24 6.95  -32 -50 40 Left superior 
parietal lobule 
0.000 438  0.000 4.75 6.44  6 10 52 Right 
supplementary 
motor cortex 
0.000 173  0.001 3.86 5.46  -42 2 30 Left precentral 
gyrus 




















Figure 4. Conjunction analysis of Uninstructed minus Instructed. A: Inferior aspect, B: 
Superior aspect. 
 
The average positive effect of condition as compared to baseline is shown in Figure 5 
and Table 5. When the conditions were not subtracted from each other, activation was visible 
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Table 5 






p(FWE) Size  p(FWE) T Z  x y z Area 
0.000 2684 
 
0.000 14.08 65535 
 




0.000 12.65 65535 
 




0.000 12.14 65535 
 





0.000 10.58 7.75 
 




0.000 10.45 7.69 
 





0.000 9.17 7.09 
 






0.000 6.81 5.76 
 




0.000 6.57 5.61 
 





0.023 5.21 4.67 
 
-12 -10 4 Left thalamus 
 
Discussion 
The goals of this study were to develop an auditory adaptation of the WCST, and to 
investigate the commonality between the auditory and visual variants of the test. It was 
hypothesized that a comparison of the auditory and the visual tasks would only show 
differences in the sensory cortex, and that the uninstructed sorting task would show more 
activation related to executive functions than the instructed sorting task. Comparing average 
activation across all tasks with rest was hypothesized to show activity in dorsolateral PFC as 
well as parietal areas related to attention.  
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Modality Equivalence 
The main effect of Modality did not show activations outside the sensory cortices, 
which can be interpreted as the AST being equivalent to the WCST when it comes to 
engaging the executive system. 
Beauvais, Woods, Delaney, and Fein (2004) evaluated the validity of a tactile version 
of the WCST. They concluded that this version made for the visually impaired successfully 
differentiated between healthy and neurologically unhealthy persons. 80-89% of the 
neurologically and visually impaired were correctly classified by the tactile WCST. The 
present study only looked at healthy individuals, but at least for them, the Auditory WCST 
seems to be equivalent to the Visual WCST (see Figure 1). 
Uninstructed Sorting Minus Instructed Sorting 
The original idea behind using an instructed sorting task as a control condition for the 
sorting task was to cancel out activation related to maintaining information in working 
memory, while leaving in activation related to more purely executive functions, such as 
cognitive flexibility and inferential thinking. In the instructed task, the subjects were told 
along which dimension to compare the two stimuli. To solve this task, one needs to remember 
the instruction, apply attention towards the valid dimension, remember the value the first 
stimulus had along that dimension, then compare it to the value contained in the second 
stimulus. In the uninstructed sorting task, there was no instruction to remember, but in its 
stead there was a need to maintain a working hypothesis about what the valid rule was, and 
continually update this hypothesis as more feedback was acquired. Already at this point one 
could say that an assumption about the paradigm has been violated. The control condition was 
supposed to cancel out activation related to working memory maintenance when subtracted 
from the uninstructed condition. However, the uninstructed task lays a heavier memory load 
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on the subject, given that in addition to the sorting rule and the trial-by-trial stimuli, the 
subject has to remember which rules he or she has tested previously, and what feedback was 
acquired. A solution to this could be to add an extra item or several for the subject to 
remember in the instructed condition. The next issue to discuss are the executive functions 
hypothesised to be unique to the uninstructed task. 
What is unique to the uninstructed task is the need to draw out the sorting rule by 
generating a hypothesis, testing it, and either changing it or confirming it. In addition to 
maintaining the necessary data, which was discussed in the previous paragraph, there is a 
need to simultaneously evaluate the possible inferences that can be drawn from the data and 
decide how to eliminate alternatives in the next trial. In order to do this, one needs to be able 
to sometimes keep a representation firm, and sometimes open it up and change it. To 
summarise, what is demanded to a greater degree in the uninstructed task includes close 
monitoring of contents in working memory and new, exogenous feedback, as well as flexibly 
producing and reiterating hypotheses regarding what the information means and what to do 
with it. Monitoring multiple items in working memory has been associated with the lateral 
PFC (Buschman et al., 2012; Petrides, 2000), while cognitive flexibility to a certain extent 
relies on the same underlying processes – having two thoughts at once is a prerequisite for 
changing one’s mind and for delicately responding differently to different contexts. But as 
have been seen from studies on bilinguals (Becker et al., 2016), on differences in response to 
sentence complexity (Prat & Just, 2010), and on monkeys learning new categories 
(Antzoulatos & Miller, 2011), cognitive flexibility, in terms of actually developing 
representations from the ground up, is predicated on an interplay between the PFC and the 
striatum.  
The term ‘cognitive flexibility’ seems to sometimes refer to the ability to fluidly shift 
sets, and set-shifting tasks seem to be the type of task that engages the ACC in studies on 
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cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2004). Whether this means that this definition of flexibility 
is equivalent to cognitive control, or that both flexibility and control are needed to solve set-
shifting tasks is not entirely clear. At any rate, set-shifting tasks and cognitive control are 
associated with the ability to inhibit prepotent responses, as well as preparing an attentional 
set or a response set. Set shifting is required in both the instructed and the uninstructed task, 
since which stimuli to respond to changes within the same sorting rule (e.g. yellow triangles 
to yellow crosses, or two repetitions of “ba” to two repetitions of “pa”). It is probably still the 
case, however, that there are greater set-shifting demands in the uninstructed task, given that 
the subject’s inferences will change. In addition, the uninstructed task demands shifting 
between responding according to a hypothesised rule and developing said rule.  
The pattern of activation seen when subtracting the instructed tasks from the 
uninstructed ones, resembles that of the DAN in Corbetta & Shulman (2002), especially so 
after applying the conjunction filter (see Figure 2 and Figure 4). This network was originally 
proposed to underlie the endogenous control of attention towards locations, features, or 
objects, as opposed to letting attention be exogenously captured by salient properties in the 
perceptual field. As mentioned above, shifting attentional set is a function expected to be 
engaged in both the uninstructed and the instructed tasks, but perhaps to a greater degree in 
the uninstructed ones. This task requires a recurring refocusing of attention between the 
different stimulus dimensions, the task feedback, and the hypothesising about which rule is 
currently in effect. The absence of any activation in dorsolateral PFC was a bit surprising, 
though, given this areas known contributions to monitoring of multiple items in working 
memory (Buschman et al., 2012; Petrides, 2000) and cognitive flexibility (Antzoulatos & 
Miller, 2011; Becker et al., 2016). Looking at the average activation across conditions 
compared to baseline, reveals the “missing” lateral PFC activation, covering both medial 
frontal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus bilaterally (see Figure 5). This means that in the 
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contrast most relevant to the experimental design, activations in lateral PFC were subtracted 
out.  
If the assumption should be held that the design and analysis of this experiment was 
flawless, then one would have to accede to the proposition that in these sorting tasks the 
lateral PFC is only involved in simple maintenance of items in working memory. This would, 
however, go against much literature stating that the storage of working memory 
representations is done elsewhere. It is also unlikely that even if the researchers did 
everything right that it is even possible to control for working memory without also 
subtracting out other functions, such as attention. Lebedev, Messinger, Kralik and Wise 
(2004) found that most neurons in PFC code for attended and not for remembered locations. 
Rushworth, Nixon, Eacott, and Passingham (1997) found that lesions to the ventral PFC in 
monkeys did not affect short term memory. D’Esposito and Postle (1999) reviewed eleven 
reports on memory span in patients with lesions to the dorsolateral PFC, and found that none 
of the 166 patients described showed significant deficits in this regard. So, if the presently 
reported subtracted out activation in PFC does not reflect short term memory maintenance, 
what does it reflect? 
The prefrontal activation might just reflect the fact that the subjects were processing 
the trial information, while using the output of these computations to decide how to respond 
as well as whether or not to recruit the DAN to aid in the task. Even though the uninstructed 
task is clearly more difficult, the instructed task still demands some effort, as it is not an 
everyday thing to compare features in this way. Furthermore, one should assume that the 
subjects were trying their best to perform. If this is the case, then some of the functions 
uniquely engaged by the uninstructed task might have been camouflaged by this common 
activation, as they might not have demanded a sufficiently large haemodynamic response on 
top of the one already there from simply engaging with the tasks. There is no way at present 
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to determine whether the activation seen in the main contrast (uninstructed minus instructed) 
captures all the executive processes unique to the uninstructed task, but the possibility will 
still be entertained in the following sections. 
Sustained attention has been difficult to separate from working memory in studies that 
have tried (Ikkai & Curtis, 2011; Jerde, Merriam, Riggall, Hedges, & Curtis, 2012; Ptak, 
Schnider, & Fellrath, 2017). The uninstructed task probably incurs a higher maintenance cost, 
despite efforts made to equalise. In addition, cognitive effort is associated with an increased 
need to inhibit irrelevant information (Haegens, Osipova, Oostenveld, & Jensen, 2009). The 
DAN partially performs its functions by inhibiting irrelevant information (Händel et al., 
2011). Finally, flexibly switching between different stimulus-pair (or feature-pair) 
comparisons and reconfiguration of plan is likely to depend on a broad network of areas, 
which would increase the need for long-range synchrony and controlling which connections 
oscillate in phase with each other and which oscillate out of phase with each other. Given the 
DAN’s already known involvement with modulating brainwaves across the brain in attention, 
motor intentions, and working memory, one can speculate that the activation seen in the 
present experiment reflects something like a conducting of cognition. Indeed, such phase-
dependent oscillatory codes have been found in the communication between areas equal to or 
close to the FEF and IPS (Antzoulatos & Miller, 2016; Jacob, Hähnke, & Nieder, 2018; 
Salazar, Dotson, Bressler, & Gray, 2012). Whether the “higher level” operations needed to 
perform the WCST take place in a discrete area such as the dorsolateral PFC, or emerge 
through network interactions, is an open question. If the operations are coded in distinct 
phases of neural oscillations, then these might not necessitate a haemodynamic response 
where the operations are taking place (for example the PFC). However, in order for these 
oscillations to stay in rhythm while also flexibly fetching different items from working 
memory, the rhythms across the brain would have to be tightly controlled. A robust 
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haemodynamic response in the DAN would probably be seen both if the operations take place 
in the DAN itself and if the DAN is only supporting the PFC. 
Compared with Lie, Specht, Marshall and Fink (2006), our results suggest activity 
more dorsally in the parietal lobe and more posteriorly, and slightly more laterally, in the 
frontal lobe. The tasks used in the present experiment differ from theirs in that it is actually a 
delayed matching task, while theirs more closely resembles the original WCST where the 
target stimulus and the reference stimuli are simultaneously present. The more ventral 
activation in parietal cortex around the temporoparietal junction in their study could reflect 
that visual attention was moving more between different stimuli. Lie et al. (2006) also 
reported activation in the ACC, which correlated with increasing task demands. In the present 
experiment, there was no activation in ACC in the Uninstructed minus Instructed contrast. It 
is possible that these differing results reflect that in their study, the subjects had to pick a 
response among four alternatives, while in the present experiment, only two alternatives were 
available. However, the fact that the ACC was equally involved in all conditions in the 
present experiment, while correlating with task demands in Lie et al. (2006) is puzzling. 
Comparing their image of the conjunction of each condition minus high-level baseline with 
the Positive effect of condition in the present experiment, yields very similar activations 
bilaterally in the dorsolateral PFC, IPS, SMA, and the ACC.  
A frontoparietal pattern was also found by Specht, Lie, Shah, & Fink (2009), although 
their particular design revealed a laterality effect that the present study wasn’t equipped to 
show. 
Konishi et al. (1998) and Konishi et al. (1999) found activation bilaterally at posterior 
inferior frontal sulcus when subjects were shifting their cognitive sets. Although in our design 
we don’t have the option of extracting the activation specific to set shifting, we also found 
activation at the intersection of precentral gyrus and inferior frontal sulcus.  
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Instructed Sorting Minus Uninstructed Sorting 
As the pattern of activation left in the instructed sorting task after subtracting the 
activation of the uninstructed sorting tasks resembles the DMN (although less canonically 
than how the first contrast resembles the DAN), one might conjecture that the subjects had 
some mental resources left over even while giving responses to the instructed sorting tasks. 
These results should not be taken as evidence that working memory was not active, however, 
because such activity would have been cancelled out by the contrast used.  
In the instructed sorting tasks, attention would only be needed to read the message 
stating which rule is currently in effect, and to compare the first with the second stimulus. 
Attention would be free to wander in between trials. In the uninstructed sorting tasks, 
however, attention would have to be given in between trials as well, because previous 
feedback would have to maintained in order to interpret the next trial. Together with not 
having to switch between sets, this would relieve the need for a frontoparietal attention 
network to control attention and show up on the images. In the instructed sorting tasks, 
attention can flow naturally from rule notification to stimulus 1 to stimulus 2. In the 
uninstructed sorting tasks, however, attention has to be manually controlled to maintain 
previous feedback, then to the stimuli, and back again. Depending on how efficient a strategy 
the subject uses to solve the task, there could be several more switches. Switching is a 
complicated construct, though. On the face of it, one might think that it’s simply about 
releasing a set or a representation, so that a new one can step in. But given what we know 
about the ACC and prepotent responses, it seems switching would also require a controlled 
inhibition of the pre-switch set. And of course, the post-switch set needs to be maintained as 
well. 
Vatansever, Menon, and Stamatakis (2017) compared cerebral bloodflow between 
WCST and a control condition where the to-be-sorted cards were identical to one of the 
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reference cards. That study also showed recruitment of a frontoparietal network similar to the 
one reported here. However, Vatansever et al. (2017) hypothesised that these brain areas 
would be more active in the first five trials of every sorting rule, while the subjects were 
trying to figure out which rule was valid. They therefore proceeded to compare the BOLD 
contrast between trials 1-5 and trials 6-10, which confirmed the DAN’s involvement in the 
early trials. The later trials, however, showed a larger effect in the DMN. Vatansever et al. 
(2017) attribute this to memory processes being more relevant to solving the later trials, and 
so they conclude that the DMN-activation reflects some kind of «autopilot» mode of 
responding when the sorting rule has been learned. 
In a similar paradigm by Provost and Monchi (2015), it was also shown that the DMN 
becomes more active when performing the same task repeatedly over many trials. In that 
study, the subjects were always informed of which rule was currently valid, but in one 
condition the rule would change every trial, and in another it would stay the same for twelve 
trials in a row. Whether the DMN contributes to the execution of familiar tasks, or familiar 
tasks simply allow cognitive resources to be directed towards task-unrelated issues, was 
deemed an open question by Provost and Monchi (2015). The instructed sorting task in the 
present experiment is most similar to Provost and Monchi’s (2015) repeated task condition, 
which is also reflected in the similar activations seen.  
Regarding the Question of Whether the WCST is Suited to Detect Frontal Lesions 
Both conditions show a clear frontal involvement compared to baseline, but the 
activation also covers a wide range of other areas. The present results therefore echo the 
sentiment that the WCST might very well be sensitive to frontal lesions, but in order to also 
be specific to frontal lesions, deficits associated with posterior areas would have to be 
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controlled for. However, the test could be used as an early marker for any deficits at all in 
executive function, since it requires the interplay of so many processes.  
Strategy 
Another factor contributing to performance on the WCST that has not been mentioned 
yet is the ability to perceive the logical contingencies required to interpret the feedback 
properly. When the previously correct sorting rule results in negative feedback, and you try a 
different rule which also results in negative feedback, you should try a third rule rather than 
revert to the original one. Failure to cycle through the rules in the most efficient order, can 
result in errors even after controlling for memory failure, distraction and inflexibility. There is 
also the possibility of getting hung up on the concrete levels of the dimensions, instead of the 
dimensions themselves. So that when receiving negative feedback for placing a yellow card in 
the yellow pile, the next trial you think you should try placing a green card in the green pile. 
Not interpreting the feedback correctly (thinking it was the particular colour that was 
pertinent, and not the higher level dimension) in this case leads to a misguided task set for the 
next trial, which can result in errors not explained by variation in memory, concentration or 
flexibility. 
It is possible, however, that the process of testing out hypotheses about the sorting rule 
is simpler than what it seems like when trying to describe it. For example, testing out the 
hypothesis of colour being the rule only demands a button press and either mentally crossing 
out ‘colour’ if the feedback was negative, or settling into colour as an attentional set if the 
feedback was positive. 
Thoughts on the Relation Between Executive Functions and the World We Inhabit 
The executive functions are grouped by their common quality of sub-serving goal-
directed behaviour through a concurrent consideration of personal goals and how these relate 
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to the many contexts a person inhabits. Sometimes the goals can be too sharply defined, as in 
the myopic schedules of people struggling with addictions. Other times the goals can be too 
vague, leading to nothing quite capturing your attention, as in ADHD. And yet other times, 
one can’t separate the context from one’s own goals, which might be part of the experience of 
schizophrenia. In Western societies today, each person is expected to set his or her own goals 
from a young age, and the expected arrival at these goals is often placed several years – 
sometimes decades – into the future. At the same time, one is expected to understand that 
everybody one meets has their own goals and reasons for acting the way they do, and that 
most everything one sees in a city was designed, produced, consumed, and, eventually, 
thrown away for any number of reasons. That living in an urban environment is a risk factor 
for developing schizophrenia is perhaps not so strange (McDonald & Murray, 2000). If the 
striatum codes for the behavioural relevance of things, and a dysregulated striatum produces 
psychosis, then what we refer to as ‘reality’ may very well be something fundamentally 
defined not objectively, but through intersubjective behavioural relevance. And if that is the 
case, then the social aspect of psychosis should not be underestimated. 
Limitations 
In order to uncover brain activity specifically related to executive functions beyond 
working memory storage functions, it's crucial to have a clear idea about which executive 
functions actually can be divorced from short term memory. After reviewing the literature, 
this has proved more difficult than expected. Although there are studies reporting such 
dissociations (Petrides, 2000), several theories about working memory emphasise how 
keeping information online is a result of there being a top-down signal "asking" for it 
(D’Esposito & Postle, 2015; Miller & Cohen, 2001). In addition, there is a strong possibility 
that so-called "higher" cognition always takes place within working memory, as the 
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manipulation of items in memory could be described as items in memory themselves. Finally, 
if working memory contents can be distinguished by their oscillatory signal, then maybe types 
of executive functions also are separated on this level - and not on a structural level. Future 
experiments on the research questions posed here would benefit from a thorough 
consideration of these possible confounds, and selecting hypotheses with clear implications 
with regards to theory.  
One concrete recommendation for a future study would be to carefully count the 
number of items subjects would need to keep online, and adjust the control conditions 
accordingly. Another concrete recommendation addresses control processes. Since the control 
of responses may well be supported by the same processes that support the control of thoughts 
(Ptak et al., 2017), using a control condition where the subject does not submit overt 
responses could safeguard against this particular confound. The choosing of cards would then 
have to be done automatically by the computer, and in such a way as to provide the subject 
with just enough information to deduce the rule. Finally, the information value of fMRI-data 
can be enhanced by applying dynamic causal modelling, allowing for inferences to be made 
regarding the effective connectivity between clusters (Friston, 2011). At least one such study 
has been done showing different connectivity for working memory and cognitive control 
tasks, respectively (Harding, Yücel, Harrison, Pantelis, & Breakspear, 2015). If a theoretically 
grounded model for the effective connectivity seen in the present results can be produced, 
then applying dynamic causal modelling is recommended. 
Conclusion 
In this brief paper, fMRI-data have been analysed that were from an experiment 
investigating on the one hand, the neural equivalence of an auditory version of the WCST to 
the standard, visual WCST, and on the other hand, the neural substrates of performing the 
WCST when maintenance of information in short-term memory was controlled for. The 
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results support that this Auditory Sorting Test is indeed neurally equivalent to the WCST 
outside of modality-specific recruitment of sensory cortices. The neural substrate common to 
both AST and WCST covers the lateral prefrontal cortices, the anterior cingulate, the frontal 
eye fields, the supplementary motor area, anterior cingulate, as well as the intraparietal sulci. 
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